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Abstract
This paper considers the so-called fallow-cultivation problem in traditional
agriculture. The paper specifies the problem and determines the optimal length
of the fallow-cultivation cycle. We also show the impact of rising output prices
on this cycle. This has been widely discussed in the literature, but we conclude
that previous stated results do not hold. The fallow-cultivation problem is an
important economic problem, since traditional farming provides the food in
most low-income countries. However, it is also worth studying since it is an
interesting specimen case in a class of dynamic models in which sensible con-
trols split process variables in distinctive phases.
Keywords: The fallow-cultivation cycle, output prices, soil conservation.
JEL classification C44; D80; Q23
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1. Introduction
In the present paper we specify and solve the so-called fallow-cultivation problem in tradi-
tional agriculture. When fields are used for pasture or crops they are gradually depleted for
substances which are essential for the plants to grow. In modern agriculture farmers make
up for this wear out effect by applying artificial fertilizer, so they can cultivate the fields
more or less continuously. The traditional peasant, however, has no access to fertilizer.
When the fields are depleted, they have to lie fallow to recover, and only after a certain
length of time can the peasant restart cultivation. Thus, we realize that a main problem fac-
ing the peasant is to determine the time pattern for switching: (i) from fallow to cultivation,
(ii) from cultivation to fallow.
Indeed, this is an important economic problem since traditional farming provides the
food in most low-income countries. In addition this problem can properly be considered
a specimen case of a set of interesting economic models, where almost any sensible con-
trol strategy splits important process variables into distinctive phases. For example firms
running an active training program to improve the working abilities of their staff must de-
cide when employees should work and when they should be in a program. In the active
phase the employees work but their efficiency will gradually decrease as their know-how
and skill become obsolete. While they are in a training program (the passive phase) the
workers do not produce but they build up their abilities (human capital) steadily and thus
become more efficient when they start to work. Similar ideas underpin the so-called return
migration theory which tries to explain a new trend in the international flows of workers
between countries.
The fallow-cultivation model has similarities with Whittle’s “Restless Bandits” (Whit-
tle (1988)) and Dixit and Pindyck’s mothball models (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). But in the
literature on dynamic economic models it has more in common with Faustmann’s model
for a rotating forest (Clark (1976)). However, compared to Faustmann’s model the fallow-
cultivation model is more general. For a rotating forest one optimizes over one option only:
when to cut the forest, since when the forest is cut one always return to a standard initial
state (Willassen (1998)). In the fallow-cultivation model we optimize over two options: (i)
when to start cultivation if the fields lie fallow, and (ii) when to lay the fields fallow if we
are cultivating.
Below we shall analyse this model thoroughly. We sketch the following plan of the
paper: In section 2 we specify the fallow-cultivation model, in section 3 we derive the
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feasible strategy and show its optimality. Environmentalists have for years been interested
in the effect of changes in output prices on the way peasants run their fields. In section 4 we
clarify the impact of varying output prices on the optimal strategy and show that previously
published results are not sustainable (Barret (1991), p. 183). In section 5 we discuss the
relation between the output price and soil fertility. Finally, in section 6 we illustrate our
propositions and results by numerical experiments.
2. Formulation
We consider a specific piece of farmland whose soil fertility is summarized by an index
variable (x). Since the farmer does not fertilize the fields, crop cultivation will gradually
exhaust the soil causing the index variable (x) to diminish. Eventually the index will reach
a level where further cultivation is unprofitable and the farmer will lay the fields fallow.
During the fallow period the farmer receives no income, but the soil recuperates.
We realize that we face an optimization problem characterized by two phases:
1. A crop cultivation period (the active phase) in which the farmer collects income by
selling the harvests but the fields deteriorate.
2. A fallow period (the passive phase) in which the farmer receives no income but the
soil recuperates.
Thus, for a given set of exogenous variables we wish to optimize over the options of being
active or being passive. In the modelling of this problem we need the variables:
x(t) - an index variable indicating the amount of crops which potentially can
be produced on the fields at time t.
p - the price of crops (assumed constant).
 - interest rate (constant).
c - a constant running cost incurred when cultivating the fields.
d
ij
- fixed costs incurred by switching between the two phases (i; j = 1; 2),
so d
11
= d
22
= 0 while d
12
> 0; d
21
> 0.
A central feature in this model is that the index x(t) diminishes in the active phase and
increases in the passive phase. Specifically, we model the state variable by specifying two
linear differential equations. We assume:
_x =  x (during crop cultivation) (2.1)
_x =  (K   x) (when the fields lie fallow) (2.2)
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In eqs. (2.1)-(2.2)  and  are positive constants and K in (2.2) denotes an upper bound on
the produce of crops. Finally, to characterize a switching strategy the indicator function 
t
is defined by:

t
=
8
<
:
1 if the fields are cultivated at time t
0 if the fields lie fallow at time t
(2.3)
For a given starting point (t; x
t
; 
t
) a switching or rotation strategy is given by the double
sequence:
! = (
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
k
; : : : ; x

1
; x

2
; : : : ; x

k
;:::
) (2.4)
where 
k
(k = 1; 2; : : : ) denotes stopping (switching) times satisfying 
k
 
k+1
, and x

k
denotes the value of the associated index (state variable) at time 
k
. To the strategy (2.4)
we associate a discounted total reward given by:
J
!
=
Z
1
t
(px
!
(s)  c) e
 s
 (s) ds 
1
X
j=1
e
 
j
 
d
12


j
+ d
21
 
1  

j
 (2.5)
Finally, we can state the farmer’s optimization problem in the following way:
Find for all initial states (t; x
t
; 
t
) the value function () defined by:
 (t; x; ) = max
!
J
!
(t; x; ) (2.6)
3. Determination of the optimal fallow-cultivation strategy
From the specification above it follows that the soil fertility (state variable) x(t) is restricted
to the interval [0; K]. Hence, for any feasible strategy (!) the discounted reward J (!) (2.5)
is finite. The value function (t; x; ) (2.6) will therefore satisfy the relevant dynamic
programming (DP) equation. The following candidate for the value function suggest itself:
 (t; x; ) = e
 t
F (x; ) (3.1)
where the value function F (x; ) splits into:
F (x; ) = F
1
(x)+ F
2
(x) (1  ) (3.2)
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In (3.2) F
1
(x) denotes the value function attained by being in a crop cultivation phase at
(t; x), similarly F
2
(x) is the value function attained by being in a fallow phase at (t; x), i.e.
F (x; 1) = F
1
(x) and F (x; 0) = F
2
(x). The value of  has to be incorporated in the state
description in order to deduce the optimality equation for F (x; ). Below this has been
achieved by deriving the optimality equations for F
1
(x) and F
2
(x) separately.
Hence, we start at (t; x) and consider a short time interval t. By using (2.5) the
optimality equations for the value functions for the two phases become:
F
1
(x) = max
i
f(px  c)t  d
1i
+ e
 t
F
i
(x (t+t))g+ o (t) (3.3)
F
2
(x) = max
i
fe
 t
F
i
(x (t+t))  d
2i
g+ o (t) (3.4)
where d
11
= 0; d
12
> 0 and d
22
= 0; d
21
> 0.
The assumption that d
12
> 0 and d
21
> 0 means that one incurs costs by switching
between the two phases.
In order to make the two optimality equations more amenable to analysis we apply
standard arguments to the expressions in the curly brackets of (3.3) -(3.4), attaining:
F
1
(x) = max
i
f(px  c)t  d
1i
+ F
i
  tF
i
+ a
i
(x)tF
ix
g+ o (t) (3.5)
F
2
(x) = max
i
fF
i
  tF
i
+ a
i
(x)tF
ix
  d
21
g+ o (t) (3.6)
where we have used the definitions:
F
ix
=
@F
i
(x)
@x
(i = 1; 2) (3.7)
_x
i
= a
i
(x) =
8
<
:
 x (i = 1)
 (K   x) (i = 2)
(3.8)
and note that F
i
is evaluated at x.
The max operation in the optimality equations means that being in either phase one has
the two options: (a) continue in the present phase, or (b) switch to the alternative phase.
Hence, being in phase 1 (3.5) has the following implications for the two options: If option
(a) is optimal then (3.5) implies:
(px  c)  F
1
  xF
1x
= 0 (3.9)
F
1
(x)  F
2
(x)  d
12
(3.10)
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If switching to phase 2 is optimal (option (b)), then (3.5) implies:
F
1
(x) = F
2
(x)  d
12
(3.11)
(px  c)  F
1
  xF
1x
 0 (3.12)
Similarly, being phase 2 the optimality equation (3.6) has the implications: If option (a) is
optimal (3.6) implies:
 F
2
+  (K   x)F
2x
= 0 (3.13)
F
2
(x)  F
1
(x)  d
21
(3.14)
If switching to phase 1 is optimal (3.6) implies:
F
2
(x) = F
1
(x)  d
21
(3.15)
 F
2
+  (K   x)F
2x
 0 (3.16)
These DP equations (inequalities) give a natural determination of the optimal fallow-
cultivation cycle. When it is optimal to cultivate crops, the value function F
1
(x) is deter-
minated by (3.9) implying:
F
1
(x) =
px
 + 
 
c

+ A
1
x
 

 (3.17)
where A
1
is a positive constant.
In this phase F
1
(x)  F
2
(x)  d
12
and one continues cultivation until:
F
1
(x

) = F
2
(x

)  d
12
(3.18)
where x

denotes a lower switch-point indicating when it is optimal to shift from cultivation
to fallow.
Similarly, when it is optimal to be in fallow phase the value function F
2
(x) is deter-
mined by (3.13), implying:
F
2
(x) = A
2
(K   x)
 

 (3.19)
where A
2
is a positive constant.
In this phase F
2
(x)  F
1
(x)   d
21
and one remains there until equality is attained
(3.15). That is:
F
2
(x

) = F
1
(x

)  d
21
(3.20)
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where x denotes an upper switch-point indicating when one should shift from fallow to
cultivation.
Thus the presumed optimal fallow-cultivation strategy ! has a simple characterization:
There exists two thresholds x

and x with x

< x
 which together with the indicator 
determine two continuation sets:
D
1
= f(t; x; ) :  = 1; x  x

g (3.21)
D
2
= f(t; x; ) :  = 0; x  x

g (3.22)
Thus D
1
and D
2
depict two curves on two parallel sheets in the state variable space.
But more can be deduced from the DP principle. If we define the difference function:
G (x) = F
1
(x)  F
2
(x) (3.23)
(3.10), (3.11) and (3.14), (3.15) imply that for all x we have:
 d
12
 G (x)  d
21
(3.24)
Hence, x

corresponds to a minimum and x to a maximum of G(x). Since F
1
(x) and
F
2
(x) are differentiable, we also have:
G
0
(x

) = 0 (3.25)
G
0
(x

) = 0 (3.26)
The equations (3.18), (3.20) and (3.25), (3.26) make up the so-called high contact principle.
This principle will give us a definitive proposal for the optimal fallow-cultivation cycle
since it provides feasible values of A
1
; A
2
appearing in the value functions F
1
(x) and F
2
(x)
and of the thresholds x

and x appearing in the two continuation sets D
i
(3.21)-(3.22).
Finally, it is instructive to verify that the formal procedure presented above solve the
problem (2.5)-(2.6). We summarize the facts in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that the value function F (3.2) satisfies the DP equation (inequal-
ities) (3.9)-(3.16). Assume further that the high contact principle hold for feasible values
of A
1
; A
2
; x

and x (i.e. the A
i
’s are positive and 0 < x

< x

< K). Then  given by
(3.1) solves the problem (2.5)-(2.6), and the strategy ! defined by the continuation sets D
i
(3.21)-(3.22) are optimal.
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Proof First note that (t; x; ) = e tF (x(t); 
t
) is continuously differentiable except
at the switching times f
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
j
; : : : g, and tends to zero as t!1. Using the funda-
mental theorem of integral calculus we have:
J
!
(t; x; )   (t; x; )
=
Z
1
t
(px
!
(s)  c) e
 s
ds 
1
X
j=1
e
 
j
 
d
12


j
+ d
21
 
1  

j

+
Z
1
t
( F (x (s) ; 
s
) + a
i
(x (s))F
ix
) ds
+
1
X
j=1
e
 
j

F

x

j
; 

+
j

  F

x

j
; 

 
j

=
Z
1
t
( F (x (s) ; 
s
) + a
i
(x (s))F
ix
+ (px
!
(s)  c
s
)) e
 s
ds
+
1
X
j=1
e
 
j

F

x (
j
) ; 

+
j

  F

x (
j
) ; 

 
j

 
 
d
12


j
+ d
12
 
1  

j


(3.27)
where F
ix
and a
i
(x) are defined by (3.7)-(3.8).
By construction (3.12) and (3.16) hold, implying that the integrand is non-positive for
all strategies ! and zero for ! = !. Similarly, since (3.10) and (3.14) are assumed to hold
the summands will also be non-positive for all !, and equal to zero for ! = !. Hence, we
conclude that:
J
!
(t; x; )   (t; x; ) = J
!

(t; x; ) (3.28)
which proves that ! in an optimal fallow-cultivation strategy. 
So much for the formalism, but what about its economic substance? When we have
determined the integration constants A
i
and the two thresholds as explained above, we
have at the same time determined the value functions F
1
(x) (3.17) and F
2
(x) (3.19) as well
as the two continuation sets D
1
and D
2
. We also note that F
1
(x) is defined on D
1
and F
2
(x)
on D
2
. In fact F
1
(x) and F
2
(x) summarize the values of the two options: (1) cultivating the
fields, (2) letting the fields lie fallow. We also observe that F
1
(x) splits into two terms. The
first one

px
(+)
 
c
p

shows the present value of the future profits accuring by cultivating
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the fields without disruption, while the second

A
1
x
 


shows the increment attainable
by utilizing the fallow option. It is obvious that A
1
must be positive. When the fields lie
fallow there will be no immediate profit, so F
2
(x) derives its value exclusively from the
future cultivation option. Again it follows that A
2
must be positive. We conclude that A
1
and A
2
for a given price (p) reflect the values of the two options.
Remark 3.1 The following observation on A
1
and A
2
is also useful. Since A
1
and A
2
are
determined by the high contact principle, i.e. eqs. (3.18), (3.20), (3.25), (3.26), it is evident
that A
1
and A
2
depend on the price (p). Furthermore , since the reward J! (2.5) is linear
in p, it follows from the general theory of optimization that the value functions F
1
(3.17)
and F
2
(3.19) are non-decreasing and convex in p. This implies that A
i
(i = 1; 2) are
non-decreasing and convex.
Although the relations between the option values and the output prices are important to the
individual farmers, the environmentalists are more concerned about peasant’s management
of their fields and soil fertility when output prices vary. We shall discuss these questions in
the next two sections.
4. Do the thresholds x

and x depend on the output price?
Having shown explicitly how the optimal fallow-cultivation cycle can be deduced, we now
wish to examine the relation between the thresholds x

and x and the output price p.
Indeed, it was this question which originally sparked off this study. How output prices
influence the way peasants cultivate and manage their farmland have always interested en-
vironmenalists. Barret (op. cit.) gives a summary of the relevant literature. Evidently, there
is no general agreement upon the impact of rising output prices on the peasants behavior.
Some authors argue that increasing output prices will stimulate the peasant to strive for still
larger profit, which inevitable will exhaust the fields. Contrary to this view others argue that
as a result of larger profits peasants can afford to invest in better soil conservative methods.
On both sides environmentalists have discussed this question without specifying an explicit
model, so the discussion is hardly more than a listing of reasonable pro and con arguments.
Barret’s study is also an attempt to clarify this problem formally. Though his model seems
incomplete since it doesn’t include output prices, it reflects the tiring and recuperative as-
pects of the fallow-cultivation phases. He summarizes his results on the impact of rising
output prices in his proposition 3 (p. 183) saying: “An unanticipated permanent increase
in the output price will have no effect on the optimal fallow-cultivation cycle, and hence
no effect on soil fertility and output”.
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Barret’s arguments may seem reasonable, but it is not evident that his conclusion is
correct. In order to clarify this question we shall apply some comparative state analysis
to the model specified and studied in the preceding section. We start with the equations
constituting the high contact principle, i.e. (3.18), (3.20), (3.25), (3.26).
px

 + 
 
c

+ A
1
(x

)
 


  A
2
(K   x

)
 


=  d
12
(4.1)
px

 + 
 
c

+ A
1
(x

)
 


  A
2
(K   x

)
 


= d
21
(4.2)
p
 + 
 


A
1
(x

)
 
(


+1
)
 


A
2
(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
= 0 (4.3)
p
 + 
 


A
1
(x

)
 
(


+1
)
 


A
2
(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
= 0 (4.4)
For given values of the economic variables fc; d
12
; d
21
; p; g and the process parameters
f; ;Kg, these equations are solved wrt. fx

; x

; A
1
; A
2
g. Then we vary the output price
p and study its effects by applying the implicit function theorem to (4.1)-(4.4). We attain:
(x

)
 


@A
1
@p
  (K   x

)
 


@A
2
@p
=  
x

 + 
(4.5)
(x

)
 


@A
1
@p
  (K   x

)
 


@A
2
@p
=  
x

 + 
(4.6)
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
 


(x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
1
@p
 


(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
2
@p
=  
1
 + 
(4.7)
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
 


(x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
1
@p
 


(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
2
@p
=  
1
 + 
(4.8)
where
G
00
(x) =



+ 1




A
1
(x)
 
(


+2
)
 



+ 1




A
2
(K   x)
 
(


+2
) (4.9)
Since we know that x

corresponds to a minimum and x to a maximum of G(x) we have:
G
00
(x

) > 0 (4.10)
G
00
(x

) < 0 (4.11)
The eqs. (4.5)-(4.8) have a convenient structure. Although, we are mainly interested in
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@x

=@p and @x=@p it is useful to know @A
1
=@p and @A
2
=@p:
@A
1
@p
=
(x

) (K   x

)
 


  (x

) (K   x

)
 


C
(4.12)
@A
2
@p
=
(x

) (x

)
 


  (x

) (x

)
 


C
(4.13)
where:
C = (+ ) (x

)
 


h
(K   x

)
 


  


(K   x

)
 


i
< 0 (4.14)
and
 =

x

x


> 1 since K > x > x

> 0 (4.15)
We observe directly that the numerator of (4.13) is negative, implying that @A
2
=@p > 0
since C > 0. Thus our pretention (3.30) is immediately verified, but we observe that to
confirm (3.29) we need some extra analysis.
At last we are ready to challenge Barret’s proposition 3 quoted above. In order to show
that it fails we shall argue to a contradiction.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that the optimal thresholds x

and x determined by the high
contact principle (4.1)-(4.4) satisfy the inequalities 0 < x

< x

< K. Then the deriva-
tives @x

=@p and @x=@p are non-zero.
Proof We shall prove this result by showing that Barret’s proposition 3 leads to a contra-
diction. Thus we assume that:
@x

@p
= 0 (4.16)
@x

@p
= 0 (4.17)
From (4.16)-(4.17) and (4.12)-(4.13) it follows directly that:
@
2
A
1
@p
2
= 0 (4.18)
@
2
A
2
@p
= 0 (4.19)
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implying that:
A
1
(p) = a
1
p+ b
1
(4.20)
A
2
(p) = a
2
p+ b
2
(4.21)
for suitable constants a
1
; a
2
; b
1
and b
2
.
The thresholds x

and x are by (4.16)-(4.17) independent of the price p, which implies
that (4.1)-(4.4) reduce to linear identities in p. Using (4.20)-(4.21) we deduce from (4.3)-
(4.4) that:
b
1

(x

)
 
(


+1
)
=  
b
2

(K   x

)
 
(


+1
) (4.22)
b
1

(x

)
 
(


+1
)
=  
b
2

(K   x

)
 
(


+1
) (4.23)
Since 0 < x

< x

< K (4.22)-(4.23) imply that b
1
= b
2
= 0. Putting A
1
= a
1
p and
A
2
= a
2
p into (4.1)-(4.2) we deduce by similar arguments that:
 
c

+ d
12
= 0 (4.24)
 
c

  d
21
= 0 (4.25)
implying that:
d
12
+ d
21
= 0 (4.26)
Inspecting (4.1)-(4.2) we find that (4.26) implies that the optimal thresholds are equal, i.e.
x

= x

. But this contradicts our hypothesis that x

< x
 and thus proving proposition
4.1. 
Now that we have proved that Barret’s proposition is not true, it is even more important
to derive constructive results showing the effect of the output price on the optimal fallow-
cultivation cycle. We summarize the facts in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 (i) Suppose that the optimal thresholds x

and x as well as the option
values A
1
and A
2
are determined by the high contact principle. (ii) Suppose also that:
A
1
(0) = A
2
(0) = 0. Then the lower threshold x

(p) is non-decreasing and the upper
threshold x(p) is non-increasing in the output price p.
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Proof From (4.7)-(4.8) we attain:
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
=


(x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
1
@p
+


(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
2
@p
 
1
+ 
(4.27)
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
=


(x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
1
@p
+


(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
@A
2
@p
 
1
+ 
(4.28)
Then, using (4.3)-(4.4) to eliminate (  1
(+)
) we deduce:
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
=

@A
1
@p
 
A
1
p



(x

)
 
(


+1
)
+

@A
2
@p
 
A
2
p



(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
(4.29)
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
=

@A
1
@p
 
A
1
p



(x

)
 
(


+1
)
+

@A
2
@p
 
A
2
p



(K   x

)
 
(


+1
)
(4.30)
If we denote the initial output price by p
0
and expand A
i
(p) around p
0
we attain:
A
i
(p) = A
i
(p
0
) +
@A
i
@p
(p  p
0
) + o (p  p
0
) i = 1; 2 (4.31)
Applying (4.31) we observe that:
@A
i
@p
 
A
i
p
=
1
p
0

@A
i
@p
  A
i

+ o (p  p
0
) i = 1; 2 (4.32)
where A
i
and its derivative are evaluated at p
0
.
Owing to the convexity of A
i
and assumption (ii) we readily find for p in the neighbor-
hood of p
0
that:

@A
i
@p
p  A
i

 0 (4.33)
From (4.29)-(4.30) we then conclude:
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
 0 (4.34)
G
00
(x

)
@x

@p
 0 (4.35)
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Since G00(x

) > 0 and G00(x) < 0 we finally conclude:
@x

@p
 0 (4.36)
@x

@p
 0 (4.37)
which were to be proved. 
Remark 4.1 The proof of proposition 4.1 shows that when the sum of the switching costs
d
12
and d
21
is equal to zero, the two thresholds collaps to a single point. Hence, it is more
the sum rather than the separate switching costs that matters. Similarly it is plainly obvious
that when (d
12
+ d
21
) increases the thresholds x

and x will be pulled apart.
5. Soil fertility with varying ouput prices
We have shown above that the lower threshold x

moves upwards while the upper
threshold x slides downwards when the output price increases. But what happens to soil
fertility when the output price rises. In the literature environmentalists air opposing views.
An intuitive guess is that rising output prices will encourage soil conservation. But not all
agree, i.e. Lipton ((1987), p. 209) argues precisely the opposite case: "... Better farm prices
now, if they work as intended, will encourage "soil mining" for quick, big crops now...".
It is tempting to use the model developed above to analyse this question formally. Ex-
cept, perhaps for initial deviations, the soil fertility index x
t
varies solely between the
thresholds x

and x. Hence, soil fertility cannot be a time independent quantity. At the
same time it is evident that environmentalists associate to soil fertility some kind of an
average depletion rate during the cultivation phase. This will be our starting point. From
our derivations above we know that the peasant switches from fallow to cultivation when
the fertility index x
t
crosses the upper threshold x and then cultivates the fields until x
t
meets the lower threshold x

. Let  denote the time it takes for x
t
to go from x to x

. We
observe from (3.8) that  is determined by:
 =
1

Z
x

x

dy
y
=
1

ln

x

x


(5.1)
14
Evidently,  depends on the output price. We calculate directly:
@
@p
= 
0
p
=
1


x

p
x

 
x
p
x


(5.2)
where we use the notations x
p
=
@x

@p
and x
p
=
@x

@p
.
From (4.36) and (4.37) we know that x
p
 0 and x
p
 0 which imply that  0
p
 0.
As the average fertility rate we define:
x(p) =
(x

  x

)

(5.3)
The question we wish to answer is this: "What happens to this average when the output
price increases"? Obviously, the natural thing to do is to take the partial derivate of x(p)
with respect to the output price. Since the average fertility rate is defined by (5.3) we easily
calculate:
@x(p)
@p
=
1


(x

p
  x
p
) 
(x

  x

)
0
p


(5.4)
We already know that (x
p
  x
p
) < 0; (x

  x

) > 0;  > 0 and  0
p
< 0. Hence, the two
terms of the bracketed expression will have opposite signs. Even a more refined analysis if
this expression did not unconditionally determine its sign.
Hence, to find out what happens to the average fertility rate x(p) over a cultivation cycle
it is probably best to show the shape of x(p) in numerical experiments. Figure (6.6) shows
a typical finding of these experiments. The average fertility rate reacts only sluggishly, but
is a slowly increasing function of the output price.
6. A numerical illustration
In order to make the contents of our propositions more accessible, we shall now illustrate
by graphs how essential variables evolve. It is enough to consider one experiment since
different numerical specifications proved to generate quite similar paths.
In this experiment we specified the following numerical values:
For the process parameters: (; ;K) = (0:05; 0:05; 50)
For the economic variables: (c; d
12
; d
21
; p; ) = (1; 10; 100; p; 0:05), and the output price
(p) runs from 1 to 2.05.
We report the results in figures (6.1)-(6.6). Figure (6.1) shows the graphs of the two
continuation sets D
1
and D
2
(3.21)-(3.22). We observe that D
1
and D
2
depict two curves
on two parallel sheets. The stippled straight lines connecting these curves indicate the
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Figure 6.1: The relation between the time and soil fertility (state variable) x in the fallow
phase (2) and cultivation phase (1)
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Figure 6.2: The relation between the output price and the option value A
1
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Figure 6.3: The relation between the output price and the option value A
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Figure 6.4: The relation between the output price and the upper threshold x
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Figure 6.5: The relation between the output price and the lower threshold x

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Figure 6.6: The relation between the output price and the average fertility rate (5.3)
switches: (i) from fallow to cultivation, (ii) from cultivation to fallow. Figures (6.2)-(6.3)
shows the relations between the output price and the two option values A
1
and A
2
. The
graphs are obtained by solving (4.1)-(4.4) when p runs through the interval [1; 2:05]. The
graphs confirm the results of our formal analyses. Figures (6.4)-(6.5) show the relations
between the thresholds x and x

and the output price. Also these graphs are attained by
solving (4.1)-(4.4) when p traverses the interval [1; 2:05]. The graphs confirm our results
stated in proposition (4.2). Finally, figure 6.6 shows the dependency of the average fertility
rate (5.3) and the output price.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a formal analysis of the fallow-cultivation problem in tradi-
tional agriculture. We have shown how our modelling approach can be used to determine
the effect of rising output prices. In order to make the analysis simple we have only studied
the pure fallow-cultivation case, i.e. the fields recuperate only by laying fallow. However,
it is evident that the present modelling can be extended to include artificial fertilizer by
re-specifying the growth equations (2.1)-(2.2). We can also extend the present specifica-
tion to the case when the index variable (x) follows a one-dimensional diffusion in the two
phases.
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